The financial literature demonstrates two opposite opinions regarding the incentive effects of executive stock options (ESOs) on managerial risk taking (such as innovative activities). The management literature shows that various corporate innovations are associated with different level of risk. By combining the financial theory and the management theory, we posit that ESOs provide managers incentives to undertake corporate innovative activities that are associated with different level of risk. We find that the incentive effects of ESOs are significantly and positively associated with corporate innovative activities, with or without taking into account of the endogeneity. In addition, the risk-taking incentives of ESOs in old economy firms are not as significant as those in new economy firms, somehow explaining why some prior studies question the incentive effects of ESOs on managerial risk taking.
INTRODUCTION
Innovation is critical for firms' long-term growth and profitability. Rudis (2004) shows that nearly 78 percent of the 540 CEOs interviewed rank stimulating innovation, creativity and enabling entrepreneurship to be their top objectives. The literature shows that a firm's innovative decisions are likely affected by such firm-specific factors as slack resources, firm size, executive and institutional stock ownership, R&D expenditures and firm age (Rosner, 1968; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Acs and Audretsch, 1988; Zahra, 1996; Love and Roper, 1999; Stuart, 2000) .
In addition, managers' risk-taking willingness plays a key role in corporate innovative activities. Damanpour (1991) and Wan et al. (2005) argue that managerial attitude toward changes dominates corporate innovation. Managers are concerned with their human capital and thus relatively risk averse, keeping firms from innovation. Some prior studies argue that incentive compensation, especially executive stock options (ESOs), can enhance managerial risk orientation and thus increase innovative investments (Holthausen et al., 1995; Hoskisson et al., 1993; Quinn and Rivoli, 1991) . The argument of these studies is evident based on the empirical result of positive association between the value of ESOs and corporate innovative activities.
Although these studies find a relation between the value of option compensation and innovative activities, such finding does not confirm the risk incentive effect of ESOs on corporate innovation. That is, the association between the Black-Scholes value of ESOs and innovation does not directly explain why the use of ESOs provides executives with an incentive to undertake innovation. According to Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002) , the incentive effects of ESOs closely align the stock return volatility with the wealth of managerial option holdings. In other words, using ESO risk incentives instead of the Black-Schloes option value can capture the original purpose of the incentive effects of ESOs provided by a convex payoff structure. We thus argue that the risk-taking incentive effects of ESOs, instead of the value of ESOs should be examined in investigating the impact of ESOs on corporate innovative activities.
A challenge in investigating the association between the risk incentives of ESOs and corporate innovative activities is whether the ESOs can really change the willingness of managerial risk taking. The finance literature shows two opposite oppinions regarding whether ESOs can increase managerial risk taking. On the one hand, Hall and Senbet (1981) and Smith and Stulz (1985) theoretically argue that ESOs can increase managerial risk-taking level because the payoff structure is an increasing function of stock price volatility. Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) and Hanlon et al. (2004) provide empirical evidence that the incentive effects of ESOs are positively associated with managerial risk-taking. On the other hand, Ju et al. (2002) and Henderson (2005) suggest that the incentive effects of ESOs on managerial risk taking depend on the risk-aversion characteristic of executives. Moreover, Carpenter (2000) argues that risk-averse executives may not always increase their risk appetite with the provision of ESO risk incentives. Ross (2004) further argues that ESOs do not necessarily encourage executives to undertake more risk; instead, ESOs may increase managerial risk taking when the incentive effect of ESOs is high enough to change the wealth utility of executives.
Based on the finance literature, whether ESOs can increase managers' willingness in undertaking innovative activities remains unknown. However, such inconsistence may be explained by the contents of the management literature. According to Abernathy and Clark (1985) , Daniel (2002) and Benner and Tushman (2003) , innovation can be classified into exploitative and exploratory innovation. Exploitative innovation is the incremental improvement of previous efforts that are less likely to fail, and exploratory innovation is the radical development of untested methods with higher uncertainty. Undertaking different levels of innovation is followed by different risk levels, and therefore risk-averse executives may choose to undertake innovation associated with different risk level to respond to the incentives of ESOs.
Another alternative to explain the opposite argument regarding the risk incentives of ESOs is to take into account the environment that firms face. The risk incentives of ESOs on innovation in new-economy firms may differ from those in old-economy firms. For instance, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Dee et al. (2005) argue that incentive compensation is negatively related to the risk of large firms or internet firms. However, their mainly discusses the pay-performance sensitivity, in which executives are rewarded based on their ex-post performance. ESOs are ex-ante compensation, because the payoff scheme exhibits substantial tolerance for failure and reward for long-term success. Therefore, there may not be a negative association between incentive-based compensation and risk in new or old-economy firms.
Conversely, Prendergast (2000) and Ittner et al. (2003) show a positive relation between incentive compensation and risk. They argue that new-economy firms often give their executives higher discretion in decision making in response to the dynamic changes in competitive environments, leading to a higher degree of information asymmetry and implying greater difficulty in monitoring managerial behaviors. The greater monitoring difficulty in new-economy firms leads to higher demand for option compensation, and the incentive effects provided by the convexity payoff scheme of ESOs can somehow motivate more managerial risk-taking. Therefore, we expect that motivating executives in new-economy firms with ESO risk incentives will encourage them to undertake more risky innovative investments than executives in old-economy firms.
Our findings and their implications can be summarized as follows. First, not considering the endogeneity between ESO risk incentives and innovative activities, we find a positive and significant association between differently classified innovations and ESO risk incentives, indicating that different innovations provide risk-averse executives with multiple choices of risk taking when facing the decision to increase their risk taking in response to the incentive effects of ESOs. This is consistent with prior studies' findings that executives appear to undertake risky innovative activities with the provision of ESO risk incentives. Second, considering the endogeneity, we still find a significant positive relation between different innovations and the incentive effects of ESOs. The positive relation implies that a change of the exogenous determinants of ESO risk incentives leads to an increase in ESO risk incentive, followed by an increase in innovation. Third, the risk-taking incentive effects of ESOs in old economy firms are not as significant as those in new economy firms. This can explain why the use of ESOs is not guaranteed to enhance managerial risk-taking willingness.
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, in contrast to Quinn and Rivoli (1991) , Hoskisson et al. (1993) and Holthausen et al. (1995) , who examine the association between Black-Scholes value of ESOs and managerial innovation, we construct a framework of the positive linkage between ESO risk incentives and innovation. Second, we further take the endogeneity of ESO risk incentives into consideration while examining the incentive effects of ESOs on managerial innovation. Third, we provide explanation of why ESO risk incentives can motivate executives to undertake innovation, which is similar to the empirical result of Rajgopal and Shevlin (2000) that ESO risk incentives is positively related to future exploratory risk-taking.
We also provide reasons why the incentive effects of ESOs may not encourage executives to undertake innovation, which can be used to explain the theoretical analyses of Carpenter (2002) and Ross (2004) that ESO risk incentives does not necessarily enhance managerial risk-taking.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature 5 and discuss our arguments and hypotheses. Section 3 describes the empirical models and data.
Section 4 reports the empirical results, and the conclusion is made in Section 5.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES

ESOs and Business Innovation
Some economical determinants affect corporate innovative decisions. For instantce, slack resources and large size allow firms to pursue innovation, bear the cost of instituting it and explore new ideas in advance of an actual need (Rosner, 1968; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982) .
However, small firms could be more innovation intensive than large firms, because the latter may suffer from the inefficiency of a bureaucratic hierarchy (Acs and Audretsch, 1988) . In addition, executive stock ownership and long-term institutional ownership are positively related to innovation, while short-term institutional ownership is negatively associated, although outside directors' stock ownership can somewhat alleviates this (Zahra, 1996) . R&D expenditures and the establishment of R&D department are positively associated with firm innovative activities, and firm age and number of technological alliances are negatively and positively related to corporate innovation, respectively (Love and Roper, 1999; Stuart, 2000) .
In addition, managers' willingness to undertake innovation also influence a firm's innovative activities. Damanpour (1991) and Wan et al. (2005) suggest that executives' attitude toward change will dominate corporate innovation. Based on the viewpoint of risk preference, agency theory provides an explanation to managerial attitude toward risk-taking willingness.
Agency theory suggests that shareholders can diversify their portfolios with various financial instruments, and hence they are considered to be risk-neutral. Nevertheless, executives are often unable to diversify their risk because their human capital is tied closely with firm performance.
As a result, they tend to pursue their personal benefit ahead of shareholders' interest. To secure their job position, they may pass up some risky but value increasing investments, leading to the agency problem of underinvestment.
To increase managers' willingness of risk-taking and motivate executives to carry out innovation, firms provide executives with incentive compensation. Both theoretical and empirical studies propose that ESOs can enhance the level of managerial risk-taking. According to Smith and Stulz (1985) , Haugen and Sebnet (1981) and Guay (1999) , options compensation provide incentives because the payoff structure is an increasing function of firms' stock volatility.
In other words, option compensation motivates executives by providing a direct link between firm performance and executive wealth, thereby offering incentives to take actions that can increase share price. Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) and Hanlon et al. (2004) also provide empirical evidence that the incentives from the grant of ESOs are positively associated with managerial risk-taking. In addition, Quinn and Rivoli (1991) and Hoskisson et al. (1993) also suggest that option compensation can shift managerial risk orientation and increase innovative investments.
However, Carpenter (2000) illustrates that risk-averse executives may not always opt for more risk. The convexity of the option compensation encourages executives to pursue maximum payoffs and can lead to dramatic increases in stock price volatility, but under certain utility functions executives with options compensation will set the stock price volatility below the level they would choose if they were trading their own account. Ross (2004) also argues that whether or not executives would increase their risk-taking willingness depend on the wealth effect of the option compensation. In other words, ESOs do not always encourage executives to bear more risk; instead, ESOs may only motivate risk taking when the incentives of ESOs is high enough to change the wealth utility of executives.
Since the risk-taking incentive effects of ESOs remain in dispute, we try to explain why ESOs can encourage managerial risk-taking from the perspective of different levels of innovation.
According to the management literature, corporate innovation can be classified into exploitative and exploratory innovation (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; March, 1991; Daniel, 2002; Benner and Tushman, 2003) . Exploitative innovation is the repeat of previous efforts or the incremental improvement of existing methods that are less likely to fail. On the other hand, exploratory innovation is the examination of new possibilities or the radical development of untested methods that have higher uncertainty with regard to success. With the classification of innovation, different levels of innovation are accompanied by different risk levels. Therefore, in response to the incentives provided by ESOs, risk-averse executives can choose to implement lower or higher risk levels of innovation. In other words, we expect that the use of ESOs provides risk-averse executives with incentives which can encourage them to undertake more innovation, whether high or low risk. As a result, we posit the following hypothesis (in alternate form):
Hypothesis 1: ESOs provides executives with incentives to undertake more innovation which can be associated higher or lower risk level.
New Economy vs. Old Economy
The level of firm risk is different in firms facing different level of environmental uncertainty and investment opportunities, and the risk tolerance of managers may be different in firms with different level of investment opportunities. In this case, the risk incentives of ESOs on corporate innovative activities may be different, accordingly. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) show that the sensitivity of managerial pay-performance declines with the increase of variance of firm performance for larger firms. Dee et al. (2005) further show that the pay-performance sensitivity declines with the increase in risk for inherently high risk internet firms. Pay-for-performance is an ex-post compensation that rewards executives according to their performance, i.e., on the basis of managerial output. If the outcomes of the risky investments are not favorable, the executives may be punished with lower compensation (Lazear, 2000) . On the other hand, the incentive effect of ESOs is an ex-ante compensation that motivates innovative investments because this scheme exhibits substantial tolerance for failure and reward for long-term success. In other words, the ESO risk incentives reward executives when the firms' stock price goes up, but do not punish them when it goes down (Manso, 2006) . Therefore, it is not necessary to observe a negative relation between ESOs risk incentives and innovative activities.
New economy firms possess more intangible assets than assets in place, leading to rapid growth and high business volatility. New economy firms often pursue unproven, riskier strategies and invest more intensively in R&D activities than old economy firms do (Anderson et al., 2000; Murphy, 2003) . To respond to the dynamic changes in competitive environments, executives in new economy firms are often authorized with higher discretion in decision making. Consequently, the authorization may result in a high degree of information asymmetry between executives and shareholders, making the monitoring difficult. To align the interests between manages and shareholders, incentive-based compensation is often offered (Prendergast, 2000) . Ittner et al. (2003) argue that the greater monitoring difficulty in new-economy firms leads to a higher demand for option compensation, and the convex shape of the option contract can somehow motivate higher degrees of managerial risk-taking. Therefore, we expect that motivating executives in new-economy firms with the incentive of ESOs will encourage them to undertake more risky innovative investments..
Hypothesis 2: The risk-taking incentive of ESOs shows a positive effect on corporate innovative activities in new-economy firms.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Empirical Design
In agency theory, ESOs provide executives with incentives to reduce the problems of underinvestment. We assume that ESO risk incentives at time t are a crucial determinant of innovation in period t+1. Thus, the first model we employ to test our hypotheses can be specified in the following form:
Innovation is the function of several important determinants, including the risk incentive effects of ESOs, financial leverage, economic attribution, financial difficulty and investment opportunity. Harris and Raviv (1991) and Leland (1998) suggest that financial leverage creates incentives for executives to undertake risky investments. Murphy (2003) identifies U.S. firms as new and old economy to discuss the situation of stock-based compensation in these two different environments. Hanlon et al. (2004) posit that firms with higher financial distress are likely to undertake riskier projects to work their way out of such problems. Guay (1999) , Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) , and Hanlon et al. (2004) assume that firms with greater investment opportunity are expected to undertake riskier projects.
While examining the effect of ESO risk incentives on innovative activities, not only the theoretical but also empirical literature suggests that ESO risk incentives and innovative activities are endogenously determined. Smith and Watts (1992) , Gaver and Gaver (1993), Guay (1999) and Bryan et al. (2000) suggest that firms with greater investment opportunity sets will employ ESOs more often to align the wealth of executives with firm performance more closely. Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) and Hemmer et al. (1999) find that option compensation can alleviate executive risk aversion by rewarding them with incentives to undertake such investments. These studies suggest that firms are influenced by various investment opportunity sets and existing contractual environments, and thus the option compensation is set in response to these differences. Therefore, to control the endogeneity of ESO risk incentives, it is necessary to adopt another model simultaneously: 
This model illustrates the determinants of ESO risk incentives that are used to control the endogeneity of such incentives while examining corporate innovative activities. First, investment opportunity set and innovation are included because Shevlin (2002) and Hanlon (2004) argue that firms facing a greater investment opportunity set with substantial innovation will offer greater incentives to executives to undertake risky exploratory activities. Therefore, the innovation at t+1 can be thought of as an additional proxy for the firms' investment opportunity set. Moreover, Smith and Watts (1992) suggest that larger firms tend to provide greater compensation to their executives.
ESOs not only provide convexity for the relation between executive wealth and stock price, but also enhance the slope of the relation. Smith and Watts (1992) suggest that firms with greater investment opportunity sets can align managerial wealth more closely with firm performance.
Therefore, we follow Guay (1999) and add the CEO sensitivity of wealth to stock price to control the relation between the slope effect of wealth-performance and investment opportunity sets. Guay (1999) suggests higher cash compensation allows managers to diversify their personal investment and lower their risk aversion. Yermack (1995) and Dechow et al. (1996) suggest that liquidity constraints can induce firms to provide executive, with option compensation instead of cash compensation and result in a negative association between the value of ESOs and cash balances. As ESO risk incentives are likely to be positively associated with stock option values, there exists a negative association between ESO risk incentives and cash balances.
Many prior studies have used R&D intensity to measure innovative ability, which is defined as R&D expenditures divided by total sales. However, a potential drawback of this measure is that it does not capture the outcomes of innovation. To capture these outcomes, we further divide innovation into four domains according to the concepts of exploratory and exploitative innovation: New Product, Improved Product, NewRD and Alliance. According to Kochhar and David (1996) and Love and Roper (1999) , new products introduced by the firm can be viewed as a proxy for innovation. Thus, we define New Product as the frequency of new product or service announcement made by the firms. Love and Roper (1999) also show that improved products and new R&D facilities are another two proxies for innovation. Therefore, we define Improved Product as the frequency of the improvement of existing products, services, manufacturing processes or skills announced by the firms, and NewRD is defined as the frequency of newly established R&D centers announced by the firms.
The motivation for different firms to collaborate is that the project is expected to bring complementary assets together. Nohria and Garcia-Pont (1991) and Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994) suggest that firms may form coalitions to defray costs and share risk when undertaking high-capital investments or very speculative strategic initiatives. Stuart (2000) Because the value of innovation is consistently non-negative, we estimate Equation (3) with the Tobit model to resolve the truncated problem. If the residual value of ESO risk incentives is significantly deviated from zero, then there is an endogeneity between total innovation and ESO risk incentives. We then exclude residual value and use the predicted ESO risk incentives as the proxy of the ESO risk incentives to estimate Equation (3) with the Tobit model. If the residual value of ESO risk incentives is not significantly deviated from zero, then there is no endogeneity between total innovation and ESO risk incentives. We then use actual ESO risk incentives to estimate Equation (3) with the Tobit model.
ESO risk incentives. ESO risk incentive measures the risk incentive of options granted to
executives. Based on Guay (1999) , ESO risk incentive is measured as the sensitivity of the change in option value to a 1% change in the underlying stock return volatility. We use the dividend-adjusted Black-Scholes formula by Merton (1973) to estimate the value of given European call options as follows:
where S is the price of the underlying stock at the option issue date; X is the exercise price of the option; σ is annualized volatility of stock returns, which is estimated as the standard deviation of daily logarithmic stock returns over the last 120 trading days in each issuing year, and then multiplied by 252
; r is annual risk-free interest rate, which is measured as ln(1+risk-free interest rate), where risk-free interest rate is the year-end yield of 10-years U.S. Treasury bond; T is the remaining time to maturity of the option in years and is measured as the difference between the year of expiration date and the fiscal year; δ is the expected annual dividend rate over the life of the option, which is measured as ln(1+expected dividend rate), where the expected dividend rate is the per-share dividends paid each year divided by the year-end share price;
; N(.) is the cumulative probability function for the normal distribution.
Therefore, the sensitivity of the change in the Black-Scholes option value to a 1% change in stock return volatility, as employed by Core and Guay (2002) , is estimated as follows:
where ' N (.) is the normal density function.
The ESO risk incentives of the options granted in the most recent year can be estimated using data available in firms' proxy statements, the Compustat database and the CRSP database.
However, the data regarding the terms of existing options granted in previous years are not available. The ESO risk incentives of options granted in previous years in Core and Guay (2002) are estimated based on the One-year approximation (OA) method. However, the OA method requires many assumptions about unavailable parameters, such as exercise price and time-to-maturity. Moreover, all data sources report only the aggregate number of previous granted options; the number of options granted each time is not available. Thus, the ESO risk incentives in our research contain only new grant options. This definition is thus conservative in estimating the risk incentives of ESOs. We estimate the risk incentives (by Equation (6) 
Independent variables.
Investment opportunity set is included in model (1) because Guay (1999) shows that firms with greater investment opportunity sets are expected to undertake riskier projects compared to those with smaller investment opportunity sets. Besides, Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) and Hanlon et al. (2004) also argue that greater investment opportunity can induce firms to bear riskier investments. Hence, we expect a positive relation between investment opportunity sets and innovation. Investment opportunity sets is also included in model (2) because Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) and Hanlon et al. (2004) show that firms facing investment opportunity sets with substantial exploration risk tend to provide executives with greater incentives to invest in riskier projects. Therefore, we expect a positive association between investment opportunity set and ESO risk incentives.
Consistent with Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) and Hanlon et al. (2004) , three proxies are used to measure investment opportunity set: (1) Market-to-book ratio, which is measured as market value of assets divided by book value of assets. Here, the market value of assets equals the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities, with all variables measured at the end of year t. (2) R&D expenditures, which is measured as R&D expenditures for year t divided by total sales in the same year. (3) Capital expenditures, which is measured as capital expenditures for year t divided by total sales in the same year.
Harris and Raviv (1991), Leland (1998) and Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) we define Financial distress dummy as equal to 1 if the firms satisfy any of the three conditions in year t: (1) have speculative grade debt, which is measured as an S&P bond rating greater than 13 on Compustat database; (2) have a negative E/P ratio, which is measured as income before extraordinary items divided by market value of equity; and (3) have a negative book-to-market ratio, which is measured as book value of equity divided by market value of equity. Otherwise, the Financial distress dummy variable equals zero.
According to Smith and Watts (1992) ESOs not only provide a convex characteristic for the relation between managerial wealth and stock price, but also increase the slope of the association. Smith and Watts (1992) suggest that firms with greater investment opportunity sets can align managerial wealth with the interest of the firms more closely. Guay (1999) 
where the definitions of all parameters are the same as previously defined in Equation (6). We estimate Equation (7) for an option in each series of new grant options during the year and then multiply by the number of new grant options held by the executives and aggregate across each series during the year to derive the dollar measure of ESO slope. Guay (1999) and Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) show that the more the cash compensation which can be invested outside the firm, the more diversified executives are, and the lower their expected risk-aversion. Therefore, firms will tend to grant more-diversified executives with less ESO risk incentives, and thus we would anticipate a negative association between cash compensation and ESO risk incentives. However, if firms set their compensation scheme with a risk premium in the form of cash compensation, we would anticipate a positive association between cash compensation and ESO risk incentives. Consistent with Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) , we define Cash compensation as the summation of salary and bonus.
According to Yermack (1995) and Dechow et al. (1996) 
ESOs & INNOVATION: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We first conduct the Hausman simultaneity test to investigate whether an endogeneity exists between ESO risk incentives and innovation in each empirical model. We then discuss the empirical results on the association between ESO risk incentives and innovation.
Hausman Simultaneity Test
The Hausman simultaneity test for each empirical model is presented in Table 2 . From column A, we can find out that the residual value of ESO risk incentives is significantly deviated from zero, which means there is an endogeneity between ESO risk incentives and total innovation. The same result is also found in column D, which means there is an endogeneity between ESO risk incentives and alliance, total innovation for new economy. For the rest of the empirical models, there is no significant endogeneity between ESO risk incentives and innovation. Therefore, we will carry out the following empirical test according to the results in the Hausman simultaneity test.
The Regression Results for Innovation
From the Hausman simultaneity test, we find an endogeneity between ESO risk incentives and total innovation. Thus, we will use predicted ESO risk incentives as the proxy of ESO risk incentives, and the empirical result is present in Column A of Table 3 .
The estimated coefficient on ESO risk incentives for total innovation is positive and highly significant, which implies that the use of ESOs can provide executives with incentives to undertake more innovative activities. This is consistent with the results provided by Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) that ESO risk incentives are positively associated with the risky investments undertaken by the executives. In addition, the estimated coefficient on economy dummy for total innovation is positive and highly significant, which implies that new-economy firms undertake more innovative activities than other firms. Moreover, the estimated coefficients on MB ratio and capital expenditures ratio are negative and highly significant, which means that these two proxies of investment opportunity sets are negatively associated with the innovation of the firms. The estimated coefficient on R&D expenditures ratio for total innovation is positive and highly significant, which is consistent with our claim that firms with greater R&D expenditures appear to carry out more innovation.
From the Hausman simultaneity test, it is found that there is an endogeneity between ESO risk incentives and alliance. Thus, we will use the predicted ESO risk incentives as the proxy of ESO risk incentives for alliance regression. In addition, there exists no endogeneity between ESO risk incentives and the other three types of innovation, and therefore we will use actual ESO risk incentives as the proxy of ESO risk incentives for the other three types.
The empirical results are presented in Columns B to E of Table 3 . The estimated coefficients on ESO risk incentives for each type of innovation are positive and highly significant, which implies that the ESO risk incentives can encourage executives to undertake more risky innovative activities. Consistent with the results reported by Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) that ESO risk incentives are positively related to the risky investments undertaken by executives.
Furthermore, the estimated coefficients on the economy dummy for each type of innovation are positive and highly significant, which implies that new-economy firms undertake more innovative activities than other firms. Moreover, the estimated coefficients on the financial distress dummy for each type of innovation are significantly negative. This is not consistent with the positive results provided by Hanlon et al. (2004) . This negative association can be explained by the tradeoff between incentive compensation and risk. For those firms that are classified as financially distressed, providing executives attracted to risk with incentive compensation will not encourage more innovation because they are already taking enough risk. The estimated coefficients on R&D expenditures ratio for each type of innovation are positive and highly significant, which can support our claim that firms with greater R&D expenditures appear to implement more innovation.
New Economy vs. Old Economy Firms
To obtain detailed information about the association between innovation and ESO risk incentives for firms in different economies, we classify the sample into old and new economy according to Ittner et al. (2003) and Murphy (2003) . Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for the reduced sample which is classified as new and old economy, and the p-value of the Wilcoxon test that examines the difference of variables in two different economies. We find that new-economy firms conduct more innovative activities than old-economy firms. The significant differences result from the phenomenon that new-economy firms face higher competition and shorter product life cycle than old-economy firms. Thus, new-economy firms keep conducting innovative activities to maintain sustained competitiveness. In addition, ESO risk incentives are significantly larger in new-economy than old-economy firms. This is because new-economy firms provide executives with ESOs as a major component of their compensation contracts and ESO risk incentives are positively associated with the number of option granted.
Meanwhile, financial distress is significantly higher in new-economy than in old-economy firms. Firms in the new economy may undertake more risky investments to maintain competitiveness than those in the old economy, and this is more likely to result in financial distress. Also, market-to-book ratio, capital expenditures ratio and R&D expenditures ratio in new economy are significant larger than those in old economy. Firms in the new economy facing rapidly changed environment, which means they need to keep implementing innovation through continuously expanding capital and R&D expenditures. Therefore, new-economy firms may have greater investment opportunity than old-economy firms.
Based on the evidence of the Hausman simultaneity test, there is an endogeneity between ESO risk incentives and total innovation for new economy. Therefore, we should use predicted ESO risk incentives for new economy and actual ESO risk incentives for old economy. The empirical results for the estimation of Equation (1) which grouped into new and old economy are presented in Table 5 .
The Column A of Table 5 illustrates the empirical results of total innovation regression with the exclusion of the endogeneity of ESO risk incentives for the old economy. The coefficient of ESO risk incentives is positive and highly significant. Furthermore, the coefficient of leverage is positive and highly significant, implying that financial leverage will encourage old-economy firms to carry out more innovation. Moreover, the coefficients of MB ratio are both positive and highly significant, suggesting that old-economy firms with a greater MB ratio will undertake more innovation.
The Column B of Table 5 provides empirical results of total innovation regression with the inclusion of the endogeneity of ESO risk incentives for new economies. The coefficient of ESO risk incentives is positive and highly significant. The coefficient for the new economy is greater than that for the old economy in column A. This is consistent with our hypothesis and implies that the incentive effects of ESOs on innovation in old-economy firms are not as significant as those in the new economy. We also find that the coefficient of leverage is negative and highly significant for the new economy, suggesting that financial leverage would reduce the likelihood of innovative activities in new-economy firms.
CONCLUSIONS
The effects of ESOs on managerial risk-taking remain a matter of debate in the literature.
This study explains why ESOs can encourage corporate innovative activities from the perspective of different classification of innovation which are associated with different level of risk. This study also explains why the incentive effects of ESOs may not motivate executives to undertake risky innovative activities by discussing the different impact of ESOs on innovation in new-and old-economy firms. To precisely examine the risk incentive effects of ESOs on corporate innovative activities, we take into account the endogeneity of ESO risk incentives.
Through examining the risk incentives of ESOs on different innovative activities, we find a positive and significant association between different types of innovation and the ESO risk incentives with the exclusion of the endogeneity of ESO risk incentives. That is, different types of innovation can provide risk-averse executives with multiple choices of risk level if they decide to increase risk-taking in response to ESO risk incentives. This is consistent with Rajgopal and
Shevlin (2002)'s finding that executives appear to undertake more risky innovative activities with the incentive effects of ESOs. Taking the endogeneity of ESO risk incentives into consideration, we also find a significant positive association between different types of innovation and the incentive effects of ESOs. This finding implies that if the exogenous determinants of ESO risk incentives are changed so as to induce an increase in ESO risk incentives, then we would expect an increase in the subsequent corporate innovative activities.
Last, the risk-taking incentive effects of ESOs in the old economy are not as significant as those in the new economy. This can be used to explain why the use of ESOs is not guaranteed to enhance managerial risk-taking willingness.
The contributions of this study can be summarized as follows. First, compared with Quinn and Rivoli (1991), Hoskisson et al. (1993) and Holthausen et al. (1995) who examine the association between Black-Scholes value of ESOs and managerial innovation, we construct a 24 framework of the positive linkage between the incentive effects of ESOs and innovation. Second, we further take the endogeneity of ESO risk incentives into consideration while examining the incentive effects of ESOs on managerial innovation. Third, we provide reasons for the association between ESO risk incentives and innovation. The positive association is similar to the empirical result of Rajgopal and Shevlin (2000) , in that ESO risk incentives is positive, related to future exploratory risk-taking. On the other hand, the negative relation can be used to somehow explain the theoretical evidence of Carpenter (2002) and Ross (2004) that ESO risk incentives does not necessarily enhance managerial risk taking.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
This table shows the descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study. New Product represents the frequency of new product or service announcements made by the firm. Improved Product shows the frequency of the improvement of existing products, services, manufacturing processes or skills announced by the firm. Alliance shows the frequency of alliances that the firm makes with other parties. New RD is the frequency of newly established R&D center announced by the firm. Total Innovation is the sum of New Product, Improved Product, Alliance, and New RD. Innovation dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm makes any announcement of New Product, Improved Product, Alliance, and New RD. ESO risk incentives are the sensitivity of the change in option value to a 1% change in the underlying stock return volatility. Leverage the ratio of long-term debt to market value of equity. Economy dummy equals one if the firm is in the new economy and zero otherwise. Financial distress dummy equals one if the firms satisfy any of the following three conditions: (1) have spectacular grade debt, (2) have a negative E/P ratio, and (3) have a negative book-to-market ratio. Market-to-book ratio is the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Capital Expenditure ratio is the ratio of capital expenditure to total sales. R&D expenditure ratio is the ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales. Size is the log of market value of total assets. Sensitivity of wealth to stock price is defined as the sum of the change in the value of the CEO's ESO grants, restricted stock holdings and stock holdings. Cash compensation is the sum of salary and bonus. Cash balance is the sum of cash and short-term investments. (1) have spectacular grade debt, (2) have a negative E/P ratio, and (3) have a negative book-to-market ratio. Market-to-book ratio is the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Capital Expenditure ratio is the ratio of capital expenditure to total sales. R&D expenditure ratio is the ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales. Size is the log of market value of total assets. 
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This table shows the descriptive statistics of all variables for firms in new and old economies. New Product represents the frequency of new product or service announcements made by the firm. Improved Product shows the frequency of the improvement of existing products, services, manufacturing processes or skills announced by the firm. Alliance shows the frequency of alliances that the firm makes with other parties. New RD is the frequency of newly established R&D center announced by the firm. Total Innovation is the sum of New Product, Improved Product, Alliance, and New RD. Innovation dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm makes any announcement of New Product, Improved Product, Alliance, and New RD. ESO risk incentives are the sensitivity of the change in option value to a 1% change in the underlying stock return volatility. Leverage the ratio of long-term debt to market value of equity. Economy dummy equals one if the firm is in the new economy and zero otherwise. Financial distress dummy equals one if the firms satisfy any of the following three conditions: (1) have spectacular grade debt, (2) have a negative E/P ratio, and (3) have a negative book-to-market ratio. Market-to-book ratio is the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Capital Expenditure ratio is the ratio of capital expenditure to total sales. R&D expenditure ratio is the ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales. Size is the log of market value of total assets. Sensitivity of wealth to stock price is defined as the sum of the change in the value of the CEO's ESO grants, restricted stock holdings and stock holdings. Cash compensation is the sum of salary and bonus. Cash balance is the sum of cash and short-term investments. Alliance shows the frequency of alliances that the firm makes with other parties. New RD is the frequency of newly established R&D center announced by the firm. Total Innovation is the sum of New Product, Improved Product, Alliance, and New RD. Innovation dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm makes any announcement of New Product, Improved Product, Alliance, and New RD. ESO risk incentives are the sensitivity of the change in option value to a 1% change in the underlying stock return volatility. Leverage the ratio of long-term debt to market value of equity. Economy dummy equals one if the firm is in the new economy and zero otherwise. Financial distress dummy equals one if the firms satisfy any of the following three conditions: (1) have spectacular grade debt, (2) have a negative E/P ratio, and (3) have a negative book-to-market ratio. Market-to-book ratio is the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Capital Expenditure ratio is the ratio of capital expenditure to total sales. R&D expenditure ratio is the ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales. Size is the log of market value of total assets. 
